We investigate multiple biases in the individual weekly ballots submitted by the 65 voters in the Associated Press college football poll in 2007. Using censored tobit modeling, we find evidence of bias toward teams (1) from the voter's state, (2) in conferences represented in the voter's state, (3) in selected Bowl Championship Series conferences, and (4) that played in televised games, particularly on relatively prominent networks. We also find evidence of inordinate bias toward simplistic performance measures -number of losses, and losing in the preceding week -even after controlling for performance using mean team strength derived from 16 so-called computer rankings.
local newspapers, radio stations, and television stations in 41 states. Only two states (California and Texas) were represented by as many as four voters each. Table 1 Because of the geographic distribution of voters, and the virtual impossibility that a voter is able to watch all teams play in any given week, voters may be inclined to give more favorable treatment to those teams for which they have more information, and/or toward teams (or fans of teams) with whom they are affiliated. There are numerous ways in which familiarity or affiliation may be increased. Voters are likely more familiar (and more closely affiliated) with teams that are in the same geographic vicinity and/or in the same state as the voter, and/or with teams that participate in the same conference (or league) as those teams in the voter's vicinity.
Familiarity with teams is also generated through televised games, and teams not appearing on major networks may suffer by comparison. In addition, teams that are members of the six BCS leagues -those leagues whose champion receives an automatic bid to one of the BCS bowls -generally receive greater publicity than non-BCS conference members, and this might generate favor in balloting. Teams that actually played during the preceding week had the opportunity to be before the eyes of voters more readily than those which had a bye week. Also, some voters are affiliated with networks (e.g., ESPN) that televise various games in a given week, meaning that teams playing on such networks may have a higher degree of familiarity (or even affiliation) with affiliated voters versus teams that do not. Finally, in addition to simply having more familiarity with various teams, sportswriters and broadcasters may also be swayed by the implicit desire to please the primary audiences for (or to) whom they write and speak (Reinardy, 2004) .
Indeed, the Associated Press is cognizant of such issues, as evidenced by guidelines sent out by the AP itself, warning voters to "base your vote on performance, not reputation or preseason speculation," to "avoid regional bias, for or against," to avoid "homerism," and to avoid affiliations with boosters or taking inducements that could be construed as being associated with voters (Donahue, 2005) .
In this paper, we seek to examine the presence of the forms of bias described above using the individual ballots submitted by the 65 AP poll voters during the last nine weeks of 2007. All prior published research on the AP poll has suffered from a lack of availability of the individual ballots of each voter. Any and all assessments of bias have been forced instead to use the weekly aggregate of all ballots -i.e., the collective poll published each week -as the unit of analysis.
This data availability problem was allayed starting in 2006, when for the first time the Associated Press began regularly publishing on the Web the individual ballots of all participating voters. Although votes were apparently not archived in such a way for observers to view anything other than the ballots from the most recent week, for the first time a much more granular level of data was made available to the public. This level of detail allows for the scrutiny of the geographic bias of voters beyond any previous research, and it is the unit of assessment we employ here.
II. Literature Review
Concerns about poll voter bias are prevalent in the popular literature. As of July 2008, a Google search for web sites including all the terms "Associated Press college football poll bias" yielded more than 33,000 results. Many of these appear to be articles about the flaws in the BCS ranking system, but a large number relate to regional or conference (or other) biases in how voters rank the top 25 teams. As examples, consider: This is the dirty little secret of football polls. A reporter can cover only one game each Saturday, but still assumes the role of an authority in ranking the top 25 teams, based on the abridged evidence of television highlights and newspaper accounts, and the bias of regional favoritism. … Meanwhile, tens of millions of dollars in bowl invitations rest on flimsy decisions (Longman, 2002) .
Reporters and columnists are entitled to their opinion, but if they are going to insist on flashing regional bias, I think fans should insist that these folks not be given the responsibility -the privilege, actually -of having such sway over a process that is more a national trust of fandom than personal fiefdom of a couple dozen newspaper reporters (Shanoff, 2006) .
In response to Shanoff's sentiment, Dan Steinberg of washingtonpost.com performed an assessment of the AP voting during one week and concluded (unscientifically) that he could not find any specific regional bias: "for every example of a horribly over-rated Pac-10 team by a voter in a Pac-10 town, there was a Big-10 team surprisingly undervalued by a voter in a Big-10 market" (Steinberg, 2006) . In 2001, Ted Miller at CNNSI.com discussed the possible easing of the perceived East Coast bias relative to the Pacific 10 (Pac-10) conference, pointing out that of the 72 AP voters in 2001 California had four voters while Florida had only three. However, he notes that voters in the East often go to bed before West Coast night games conclude, and that East Coast-based papers and national highlight shows are often devoid of coverage of such games. Moreover, he points to the virtually religious nature of college football in the South, which can lead to responses by the media to the "conventional wisdom" that players there are "tougher than those out West because they care more." He also mentions a familiarity influence that potentially benefits schools that are consistently dominant year-to-year (Miller, 2001) .
The scholarly literature has less to say about bias in college football polls, although there is substantial literature examining various poll characteristics. Libovic and Sigelman (2001) provide an overview of the ranking literature prior to 2000 vis-à-vis college football. As they note, Tsai and Sigelman (1980) demonstrate the limited availability of top 10 positions to teams not so ranked in the previous season, and Goff (1996) showed that pre-season rankings impact those at the end of the season, regardless of results over the course of the season.
In addition, Goff's work tested for the presence of bias toward each of the 46 individual teams in his analysis (which covered 1980-1989) , as well as collectively toward teams from the Big 10 conference (including Notre Dame in that grouping). He found no preference toward the Big 10 in general, but found possible team-specific bias in favor of Big 10 schools Ohio State, Michigan, and Michigan State, as well as relatively unfavorable treatment of Air Force, Clemson, Georgia Tech, Syracuse, and Texas Tech. Libovic and Sigelman (2001) use logistic regression to study the AP polls from 1985 through 1995, to determine the factors that cause teams to move up after a win. They find that having one loss, having two or more losses, the current ranking position, whether an opening occurs higher in the ranking, the type of win (e.g., over a higher-or lower-ranked opponent), and the change in the ranking of earlier opponents all are related to the ability of a winning team to improve its ranking. These authors also conclude that the predictive performance of AP voters does not improve as the season progresses. Stern et al. (2004) provide a thorough review of the development of the BCS system and the elements of it. They reference the beginnings of the AP poll and how its coexistence with the UPI poll drove the diversity of opinion and controversy regarding the national champions that pre-dated the BCS. They note the inherent biases and shortcomings associated with the polls, and point to the BCS and mathematical ranking systems as attempts to rank teams while eliminating or at least reducing such biases. Callaghan, Mucha, and Porter (2004) review the BCS system -in the process also noting accusations of bias in the polls -and suggest that there is significant double-counting of factors such as schedule strength, numbers of losses, and quality wins. They propose the likelihood that a simple random walk methodology that they refer to as "a collection of trained monkeys" can generate rankings as good as those provided by currently available systems.
Coleman (2005) above the norm is a significant factor in AP voting results. As part of their analysis, they also test for the presence of bias toward teams from BCS conferences, as well as bias associated with each specific team in their study (the latter being also a possible measure of bias associated with market size). They conclude that AP voters do not have biases associated with particular teams.
They also find no bias associated with whether a team is from a BCS conference; however, playing an opponent in a BCS conference is significant, although likely as a proxy for opponent strength. Paul, Weinbach, and Coate (2007) also emphasize the role of television, but they question whether TV exposure drives the voters in the polls, or whether the poll ranking directs networks to televise the games that are perceived to be most important. Of the seven national networks they examine, they find that games televised on six of the seven (excepting only NBC)
were related in some way to AP poll votes. They also find that televised and non-televised losses carry greater weight than wins, with the effects of wins and losses somewhat magnified by television. However, these authors place emphasis on the gambling point-spreads as determinants of rankings, given the nature of spreads as measures of market (or voter) expectation. They conclude that performance vis-à-vis the spread is a significant driver of how teams fare in the polls.
Finally, Logan (2007) employs 25 years of AP voting to address three common perceptions of biases in the polls. He emphasizes losses early or late, strength of defeated opponents and winning margin. His conclusions are contrary to the typical expectations relative to those biases, suggesting that it is better to lose later than earlier, strength of a defeated opponent is irrelevant, and margin of victory is irrelevant.
III. Data and Variables
We collected the ballot submitted by each AP poll voter for each of the final nine polls observations of ranked teams: 25 ranked teams for each of 65 voters for each of nine weeks. We reverse-coded the value assigned to each ranked team by the respective voter, so that the topranked team was assigned a value of 25, the second-ranked team was assigned a value of 24, etc., with the 25th-ranked team receiving a value of 1. This approach is comparable to the manner in which the AP aggregates the 65 individual ballots into the collective poll. It also allowed us to refer to higher-ranked teams as those with higher values, thereby making interpretation of results more straightforward.
In order to allow comparison of those teams receiving votes and those teams that did not, to each voter's ballot in each week we added information on the 95 FBS teams that did not receive a top 25 vote (i.e., did not appear anywhere in the top-25 ballot) from that voter.
1 Each of these teams was assigned a value of zero. Complicating this process somewhat was the fact that on two occasions a voter included a member of the Football Championship Subdivision (or FCS, formerly known as Division 1-AA) in his top-25 ballot for the week: Appalachian State was included on one occasion, and Northern Iowa was included on another. Because of this anomaly, for the sake of our analysis these two teams were treated as members of the FBS, meaning they were included in our data set with values of zero in all cases in which they were unranked by a voter. This inclusion raised the total number of teams examined to 122.
This data collection process generated a total sample size of 71,370 observations: 122 teams for each of the 65 voters, for each of the nine weeks examined. In order to test for our hypothesized biases, for each of these observations we collected a variety of additional information, which is summarized in Table 2 and detailed below.
The first three were designed to capture familiarity bias associated with a voter's location. Using the state in which the respective voter was located ( familiarity bias in favor of such teams, and it may also capture a larger and more general regional bias on the part of the voter (e.g., toward eastern or southeastern teams in this example).
In addition, and because voters may be also quite familiar with teams in nearby states, we computed the distance in miles between the voter in that observation and the team named in the observation. In each case, we used the zip code of the voter's employer and the zip code of the school to identify the latitude and longitude of each party, and then calculated the straight-line geographic distance between the two using trigonometric methods.
Following the lead of Campbell, Rogers, and Finney (2007) These binary variables captured a familiarity bias associated with the team playing a televised game during the most recent week. Moreover, and similar to the approach of Campbell, Rogers, and Finney (2007) , we also wished to examine any cumulative familiarity effect of a team appearing in televised games. To do so, we constructed six variables reflecting the number of televised games in which the respective team had appeared up to that point in the season on that type of network, but not including the week in question.
A third set of variables captured familiarity bias associated with whether a voter has the opportunity to see a team play the week before casting a ballot. One binary variable represented whether a team even played during the most recent week, and another reflected whether the team lost during the most recent week. The latter was partially spurred by the work of Lebovic and Sigelman (2001) , which indicated that AP poll voters consider the number of losses when determining poll movements. Goff (1996) showed that the number of losses was a highly significant factor in AP rankings. The results of Paul et al. (2007) emphasized a greater effect from losses than wins for both televised and non-televised games. Moreover, Lebovic and Sigelman (2001) suggested that there was a cumulative effect of losses. Thus, we also constructed -in part as a control variable, but also as a measure of bias toward simplistic performance measures -two variables reflecting the cumulative number of losses for that team up through the most recent week. Similar to Lebovic and Sigelman, the first was a binary variable reflecting whether a team had at least one loss by that point in the season. The second reflected the number losses beyond one by that point in the season. 3 As discussed below, we included in our analysis a much more complex and comprehensive control variable for team performance. Thus, the significance of either the number of team losses or whether a team lost in the most recent week could reflect a bias toward quite simplistic performance measures on the part of voters.
A fourth set of variables was constructed to capture any bias toward teams in each of the six Bowl Championship Series (BCS) conferences: the ACC, the Big 10, the Big 12, the Big East, the Pac-10, and the SEC. As noted earlier, the champions of these conferences each receive automatic bids to play in one of the BCS bowls, which are the highest-paying of all postseason games. Members of these leagues, along with independent Notre Dame (which receives an automatic BCS bid if it wins a particular number of games), are generally considered the most significant football-playing schools.
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As a final measure of possible bias, we constructed two variables reflecting whether those three voters employed by ESPN, and who appear regularly on ESPN football broadcasts, were biased toward teams appearing on any of the ESPN family of networks. ESPN was the only media entity represented by three voters, and is the most significant television entity in college football. As noted in Table 1 In order to control for team performance in the presence of the factors outlined above, for each week we collected 16 so-called computer rankings (listed in In addition, we sought to include other rankings that were leaders in either matching past performance or predicting future performance, as AP voters may seek to address either or both of these objectives (see Coleman (2005) Ashby AccuRatings, Pigskin Index, and Kambour were among the top five systems at predicting winners over the course of the entire season (Beck, 2008) . Kambour, Bihl, Ashby AccuRatings, and Pigskin Index were in the top 10 at predicting winners during the second half of the season (Beck, 2008) . Kambour, Ashby AccuRatings, Bihl, and Congrove were in the top four (including ties) at predicting the post-season bowl game winners in 2007 (Beck, 2008) .
According to Trono (2008) , McCormick, Dolphin, Coffey, and Kambour were the top four systems at predicting bowl game winners collectively over the six seasons from 2002 through 2007, and PerformanZ was sixth in that group.
Because of the strength of these systems at matching past and/or future game results, and/or (in the case of the BCS systems) because of their high profile, they were viewed as effective controls for our analysis. For each week, we computed the mean ranking from these 16 models, and used the resulting mean as our control variable for team performance.
The data collection and variable construction process generated 28 independent variables: 27 bias factors and one control factor. In order to alleviate concerns that factors associated with the number of losses and previous TV exposure were monotonically non-decreasing over time,
we standardized all the non-binary variable values within a given week by converting each to a z-score. This adjustment also allowed us to compare variable coefficients more directly to determine which factors had the strongest relationship to voter rankings.
IV. Methodology
When determining his/her ranking of the top 25 teams each week, a voter is assumed to assess the performance merits (and/or those team characteristics outlined in the previous section) of all available teams in a given week. However, the observed ranking for a given voter reflects only the ordinal realization of that voter's otherwise latent rating for each team that week, and then only for the top 25 teams in that voter's latent rating. Thus, our data set of 71,370
observations can be viewed as a censored one, in which the team value (the ranking) is censored to a value of zero for all teams ranked 26 through 121 by a given voter in a given week.
Moreover, given that the ranking is an ordinal representation of the underlying rating, we only observe a voter's order for the teams s/he ranks, and not necessarily the distance between or among teams in his/her latent rating.
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Our dependent variable is the (reverse-scored) rank assigned to each team by the voter (and equal to zero for any team not included in the voter's top 25 for that week). Therefore, we identified cumulative logit, cumulative probit, or censored tobit models as potentially appropriate approaches to estimate parameters. Using SAS Version 9.1 (SAS, 2004) , a cumulative logit model including all of our independent variables converged. However, the null hypothesis of the score test for the proportional odds assumption was rejected with a p-value of 0.0001, thereby invalidating that approach. Similarly, a cumulative probit model converged, but with warnings regarding model fit (it also failed the score test for the equal slopes assumption with a p-value of 0.0001). However, a censored tobit model did successfully converge, and it is the result of that estimation that we report here. 
V. Results
The results for all three models are shown in and 2, and these goodness-of-fit metrics were not that dramatically improved over those for an intercept-only model. The log likelihood was also much worse than the log likelihood from a model including only the control variable (-49,218) . Table 4 also contains variance inflation factors (VIFs) for Model 1, computed from an ordinary least squares fit of the model. Our control variable exhibits a relatively high VIF, which was expected given its nature as a control. However, in no case does it appear that collinearity substantially impacted the variances of the bias factors tested here nor the findings reported below.
In terms of our control factor, Model 1 indicates that the mean computer ranking is statistically significantly related in the expected direction to the placement of a team on an AP voter's ballot, with a p-value less than 0.0001. 8 Moreover, the coefficient of this factor was easily the largest in the model. These results suggest that AP votes are indeed highly related to the computer rankings, and lend credence to our selection of the included rankings as controls.
In terms of our research questions regarding bias, we find that the results for Model 1 offer support for several of our hypothesized biases. Voters appear to favor teams located in their home states, as this factor was significant at the 0.001 level. Geographic bias also extended to teams with fellow conference members in the same state as the voter, with a p-value less than 0.0001. As might be expected, the coefficient of bias toward local conferences was smaller than the coefficient of bias toward local teams. However, the coefficient for the distance factor was not significant, implying that teams that are more geographically remote from the voter do not receive less consideration than those that are located more closely. 9 The collective results for the three regional bias factors suggest that voter bias appears to be state-related and not distancerelated.
Teams appearing on television also received benefit from voters, although it was the cumulative effect of prior appearances that was typically more highly related to receiving AP poll votes than was an appearance in the current week. The coefficient of the previous number of appearances was statistically significant at the 0.0001 level in Model 1 for all six network types. Moreover, the relative coefficient sizes were generally as expected, with appearances on the national networks and the major ESPN outlets receiving the greater weights. In regard to appearances in the most recent week, only teams playing on the other ESPN outlets, the major regional networks, and the non-delineated ("other") networks received insignificant weights (under a hypothesis that each should be positive). Again, this is not surprising, given the lower overall exposure -and less prestige -associated with these outlets vis-à-vis the national networks and the prominent cable networks.
In regard to bias associated with playing and performance in the most recent week, teams that played in the most recent week were not more likely to receive greater consideration from voters, implying no overt penalty for teams during a bye week. However, losing in the most recent week was adversely treated by voters (over and above the cumulative number of losses for the team over the course of the season to that point). 10 This finding should come as no surprise to those who even casually follow college football, given the dearth of teams that seem to remain near their previous ranking immediately after a loss.
The statistically significant coefficients for the two variables reflecting the cumulative number of losses appear consistent with the findings of Lebovic and Sigelman (2001) and Paul et al. (2007) , and suggest that voters have a bias toward one of the most simplistic performance metrics available. The absolute value of the coefficient for having at least one loss was the third largest among all those in Model 1 (and significant at the 0.0001 level), and the effect was magnified even further for those losses beyond one. (Only the coefficient of our control variable surpassed the coefficients of these two factors.) Clearly, voters seem to factor in the number of losses when casting top 25 ballots. These findings are particularly notable given that our model already controls for team performance with the mean of numerous computer rankings that are much more complex and comprehensive metrics than the simple number of losses.
We also find evidence of bias in top 25 balloting favoring three of the six BCS conferences, with only the ACC appearing to be treated similarly to non-BCS schools. The Big East and Big 10 actually received a statistically worse treatment than non-BCS teams. There is little support for the notion of an East Coast bias as it pertains to the Pac-10, which actually received statistically significant favor from voters -albeit with a coefficient that was less than those for the Big 12 and SEC, which each received inordinately strong consideration also. This finding implies that favorable voter bias was attributed to conferences from the eastern, central, and western portions of the country.
10 Stated otherwise, a loss in the most recent week was treated more harshly than losses earlier in the season. Model 2, which included all of our bias factors but omitted our control variable, generated findings that were largely very consistent with those from Model 1. Even in the absence of the control, Model 2 still suggested that voting behavior exhibited state-oriented regional bias as well as TV-related bias. In addition, and like Model 1, the Model 2 results showed highly significant coefficients for the three variables representing the number and recency of losses.
Given the much larger (and highly significant) coefficients for all the BCS conferences in
Model 2 vis-à-vis Model 1, it appears that these binary bias variables served additionally as partial proxies for the missing control variable in Model 2. Moreover, the much larger Model 2 coefficients for the two variables reflecting the number of losses implies that these factors also helped to serve as a further partial proxy for team performance in that model.
VI. Conclusion
Our research confirms numerous hypothesized biases by Associated Press college football poll voters. Voter ballots exhibit bias toward teams and conferences represented in their home states, toward three of the six Bowl Championship Series conferences, toward teams that accumulate higher numbers of prior television appearances, and toward teams that played on relatively prominent TV networks in the current week. Our analysis also indicates that voters are biased toward arguably the most simplistic performance measure available -the number of losses -and inordinately punish teams accordingly in their ranking. All of the above has significant managerial ramifications on the selection and distribution of voters by the Associated Press, and whether the champions so designated would have been the same without such bias.
To the extent that similar biases may have existed in prior seasons, it also calls into question the BCS's previous use of the AP poll in its determination of its national champion. 
